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The Economics of International Competition Policy: New Challenges in the 
Light of Digitization?           
Oliver Budzinski∗ 
Abstract: The International Competition Network (ICN) celebrates its 20th birthday in 2020. 
It governs global competition by providing a cooperative forum for (mostly national) 
competition authorities from all around the world. In the absence of binding global 
competition rules and antitrust laws, it attempts to coordinate national and supranational 
competition policies by providing best practice recommendations and exercising peer 
pressure on deviating regimes. While the first twenty years of the ICN have been mostly a 
success story, the ubiquitous process of digitization poses new challenges to the voluntary 
and informal coordination of decentralized competition policies governing pro- and 
anticompetitive arrangements and conduct on international and intercontinental markets. 
First, the digitization of markets and goods increases the number of cross-border, 
interjurisdictional cases regarding cartels, mergers and acquisitions, as well as 
anticompetitive market behavior. Second, digital platforms and data-based business models 
increase the probability of dominant companies on intercontinental scales as well as 
problems of economic dependency on few global player companies. Third, the economics of 
digital platforms and data-based competition strategies partly differ from traditional 
standard economics and are still being developed in the academic world. Consequently, the 
previous convergence of competition policy practices across jurisdictions tends to shift 
towards a process of divergence with respect of how to deal with innovative pro- and 
anticompetitive conduct in the digital world. This essay discusses the influence of the effects 
from digitization on the problems of (only soft-coordinated) national competition policies in 
international markets like cross-border externalities, costs and burden of multiple 
procedures, loopholes in the protection of global competition, and the diversity of societies 
and competition regimes. It concludes by outlining the challenges that the ICN will face in 
its third decade. 
Keywords: international competition policy, international antitrust, International 
Competition Network, global governance, digitization, industrial economics, law and 
economics, international economics, international organizations, international business 
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1  Introduction 
The debate whether competition on international, intercontinental and global 
markets requires an international competition policy regime is about 100 years old. 
For a long time, solutions were envisioned in the context of international 
organizations governing the relations of sovereign nations, like the League of Nations 
or, after the Second World War, the global trading system since the 1990s under the 
umbrella of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (see with comprehensive references 
Budzinski 2008a: 134-142; Budzinski 2015: 129-130). However, the implementation 
of binding global competition rules or enforcement agencies always failed. Thus, 
national competition authorities (and international ones like the European Union), 
which are bound to territorially-defined jurisdictions that cover only a part of the 
relevant geographic markets, have to deal with companies competing on 
international and intercontinental scales. Twenty years ago, competition authorities 
from countries all around the world decided to form an informal cooperative forum 
in order to facilitate cooperation among competition authorities and create a “soft” 
process of convergence of competition rules, practices, and enforcement styles: the 
International Competition Network (ICN)1. In the ongoing absence of binding global 
competition rules and laws, it attempts to coordinate national and supranational 
competition policies by providing (consensually-derived) best practice 
recommendations and exercising peer pressure on deviating regimes. 
Among the permanent challenges for every competition policy regime, the ever-
changing phenomenon of market competition provides the most fundamental one. The 
very thing that competition laws and authorities aim to protect and to provide an 
institutional framework for is subject to permanent evolution, for instance, through 
innovative company behavior, changing consumption habits, new technologies, etc. The 
ubiquitous process of digitization represents the currently most prominent challenge for 
competition policy regimes (inter alia, Budzinski & Stöhr 2019a; Haucap et al. 2019; 
Schweitzer & Welker 2019; Budzinski & Kuchinke 2020). Most recently, four of the more 
relevant competition regimes have commissioned extensive expert reports on how 
competition laws and policies need to change in order to cope with the effects of 
digitization. Kerber (2019) provides an excellent summary and comparison of these 
reports, demonstrating similarities like a need for substantial changes as well as 
considerable differences with respect to the suggested solutions. Furthermore, virtually 
every other active competition policy regime is discussing reform needs and options in 
the face of digitization as well (inter alia, Barreto et al. 2019; Steenbergen et al. 2019).  
                                                 
1 I have elsewhere discussed the fundamental pros and cons, success stories and limits of the ICN 
approach (Budzinski 2004; Budzinski 2008a: 142-148; Budzinski 2015: 130-139). See about the origin 
and development of the ICN generally also the chapters in Lugard (2011). New empirical analyses 
about the records of the ICN present, inter alia, Abu Karky (2019) and Townley et al. (2019). 
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The implications of the considerable changes brought by digitization also affect 
international competition policy. First, competition on online markets and 
particularly competition on markets for digitized goods is inherently global and 
geographically limited only by limits to internet access or geo-blocking strategies by 
the companies themselves. The business behavior of companies like Alphabet-
Google, Facebook (including Instagram and WhatsApp), Amazon, WeChat, Apple, 
Spotify, and others is notoriously difficult to isolate regarding a certain national 
territory. Second, market structures on these markets are often narrow on a global 
scale and, accordingly, international market power by those companies is often 
higher than in the traditional offline world, inter alia, because of direct and indirect 
network effects as well as data-based business models (Budzinski & Kuchinke 2020). 
Third, antitrust policies and practices, which used to work quite well to remedy 
market power and preserve consumer welfare, may now display and cause opposite 
effects because the nature of consumption has changed (see for instance the striking 
example discussed by Budzinski et al. 2019).  
As these developments influence the (in-)effectiveness of national competition 
policies towards international anticompetitive arrangements and behavior, the 
effects of digitization provide challenges for the ICN in the transition to its third 
decade as well. This essay aims to discuss how digitization changes the needs for 
international competition policy from an economic perspective (sections 2-5). 
Furthermore, it concludes some implications for the ICN’s third decade. 
2  Cross-border Externalities of National Competition Policies 
If the geographical area of competition exceeds the geographical scope of 
competition rules and policy, the occurrence of cross-border externalities becomes 
likely even if all competition policy regimes in all jurisdictions would execute their 
competition policy according to the same law, the same standards, and the same 
underlying economic theories. Competition policy regimes are most typically 
inbound-focused in the sense that they address every anticompetitive conduct or 
arrangement that restricts competition within their borders, i.e., harms domestic 
(consumer) welfare. This so-called effects doctrine rules that anticompetitive 
arrangements or conducts are subject to national competition laws whenever they 
affect domestic markets irrespective of their geographic origin (inter alia, Griffin 
1999; Fox 2003; Budzinski 2008a: 32-49, 168-173). At the same time, 
anticompetitive effects originating from domestic companies but adversely affecting 
‘only’ markets abroad are usually not subject to national competition laws. 
Consequently, each jurisdiction tends to focus only on domestic effects, ignoring 
possible effects abroad.  
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Economic theory derives that differences in the economy and market conditions 
between countries, like for instance an asymmetric allocation of producers and 
consumers across jurisdictions within a relevant international market or different 
sizes of domestic (partial) markets, already represent sufficient conditions to 
generate cross-border negative externalities (Barros & Cabral 1994; Head & Ries 
1997; Kaiser & Vosgerau 2000; Neven & Röller 2000; Tay & Willmann 2005; Haucap 
et al. 2006; Mehra 2011; Choi & Gerlach 2012, 2013; Beinlich et al. 2020). Even if 
there is no difference in laws, standards, and theories, the decisions of national 
authorities cannot be fully compatible with each other, thus causing frictions in the 
protection of competition on the supranational markets. Even if national competition 
authorities act in the best interest of protecting competition, the inbound focus and 
the accompanying ignorance of effects on competition abroad lead to a reduction 
of global welfare compared to a situation where the geographic scope of 
anticompetitive effect and regulating regime were congruent. Note that negative 
externalities from national competition policy decisions can be both due to under-
enforcement and over-enforcement, always compared to what would be the optimal 
decision to the affected country abroad (Beinlich et al. 2017). 
The problem of cross-border externalities is aggravated when national competition 
regimes intentionally seek to harm other countries in order to increase their domestic 
welfare – or, more often, the rents of powerful national lobbies and vested interests. 
Strategic competition policy represents a strategy similar to strategic trade policy and 
belongs to the so-called beggar-my-neighbor policies, seeking to redirect rents from 
foreign to domestic parties (Fox 2000; Budzinski 2008a: 53-64; De Stefano & Rysman 
2010; Motta & Ruta 2012). In competition policy, the attempt to create so-called 
‘national champions’, i.e. domestic companies with market power on international 
markets, belongs to such strategies. The policy intention here is that domestic companies 
may exploit consumers in foreign countries (welfare loss abroad) with the profits ending 
up ‘at home’ (domestic welfare gain). A permissive merger control towards domestic 
mergers accompanied by a strict approach towards mergers between foreign companies 
would serve such a purpose as would selective non-enforcement of anti-cartel rules 
towards domestic companies, domestic antitrust exceptions for so-called (and however 
picked) “key” industries or exempting pure export cartels from an otherwise effective 
cartel prohibition. According to economic theory, strategic competition policies (like 
strategic trade policies) decrease world welfare due to (deliberately) causing negative 
externalities but regularly do not increase overall domestic welfare or the welfare of 
domestic consumers. Instead, only some domestic parties, i.e. powerful companies or 
industries, benefit – at the expense of both foreign and domestic consumers. The 
reasoning underlying strategic competition policy then merely serves the purpose to 
conceal successful lobbyism activities in an imperfect political decision process (inter alia, 
Kerber & Budzinski 2003, 2004). 
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Cross-border externalities from diverging and mutually incompatible decisions of 
national competition authorities regarding the same case may cause jurisdictional 
conflicts, in particular (but not only) in the case of strategic competition policy 
(Campbell & Trebilcock 1993, 1997; Neven & Röller 2003; Haucap et al. 2006; Beinlich 
et al. 2017). Literature lists an impressive number of jurisdictional conflicts on 
competition policy issues involving a multitude of countries (inter alia, Klodt 2005: 
45-65; Budzinski 2008a: 40-49). For instance, the European antitrust authorities’ 
challenge of the mergers between the U.S. companies Boeing and McDonnell 
Douglas (Fox 1998; Kovacic 2001) as well as GE and Honeywell (Reynolds & Ordover 
2002; Gerber 2003) caused negative externalities on trade and diplomatic relations 
between the two jurisdictions. 
The ongoing process of digitization implies more international and intercontinental 
markets as well as broader international markets. Probably, only digital markets 
where digital goods are traded can become truly global markets because as soon as 
physical goods are involved, costs of geographic distance play some role (even if they 
are ordered digitally) and limit the geographic reach of markets. And, at the same 
time, the decrease and eventual absence of costs of distance limit the scope for truly 
national or regional markets. It would be a gross over-exaggeration to claim that all 
markets are going to be digital and global, however, the number of purely digital 
markets with (almost) global scope is increasing. Moreover, the digital elements of 
the trade of physical goods facilitate its internationalization as well. Therefore, the 
likelihood of mutually incompatible decisions because of differences in the economy 
and market conditions between countries increases and, thus, problems from cross-
border externalities caused by national competition policies become more relevant 
and more pressing. In particular, the asymmetry of the allocation of producers and 
consumers has increased with the (almost worldwide) dominance of U.S.-based 
companies like Alphabet-Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Netflix, and others in 
markets like search engines, social media services, online marketplaces, shopping 
comparisons services, streaming, etc. The current wave of national antitrust 
proceedings against the mentioned internet giants in a multitude of jurisdictions is 
likely to cause welfare-decreasing externalities from both under- and over-
enforcement with respect to (side-) effects abroad. Just as the preceding period of 
virtually no national antitrust interventions against obvious anticompetitive conduct 
by these companies decreased welfare through under-enforcement. 
Furthermore, a new uprising of strategic competition policies appears to be on the 
horizon, fuelled by a general comeback of protectionist policies, (not only) driven by 
the U.S. In the EU, for instance, politicians are calling for reforming competition 
policy to promote “European Champions” or allowing exemptions from merger 
control for “strategic industries” (see Budzinski & Stöhr 2019b for a discussion with 
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further references). While one of the cases motivating these – so far unsuccessful – 
new initiative is firmly rooted in traditional industries (the Siemens-Alstom-merger), 
similar patterns of reasoning are surfacing with respect to the digital economy and 
the (real or perceived) dominance by American firms. Furthermore, the merger-and-
acquisition activities by Chinese government funds cause concerns about strategic 
intentions and, consequently, debates about establishing defense measures in 
competition law and policy. 
In summary, the problem of cross-border externalities from national competition 
policies is likely to significantly increase due to the process of digitization. 
3  Costs and Burden of Multiple Procedures 
If national competition authorities treat antitrust cases in international markets each 
by each in a non-coordinated way, then multiple competition policy procedures of 
the same case are conducted parallel to each other. Global players often face 
antitrust proceedings with respect to mergers and acquisitions, cartel offences, or 
abuse of market power from (sometimes by far) more than twenty jurisdictions at 
the same time on the same case and conduct. These multiple procedures on the same 
case cause administration and transaction extra costs that reduce welfare in all 
affected jurisdictions. First, costs for taxpayers increase if virtually the same facts of 
the case are investigated in a parallel effort by multiple competition authorities. Most 
of the doubling, tripling and multiplying of investigation costs merely increases the 
‘production costs’ of competition policy without yielding additional ‘output’, insights 
or benefits. Second, if companies face multiple procedures they have to provide 
information to multiple competition authorities in multiple languages with multiple 
legal experts of multiple law systems and by paying multiple notification, submission 
and consultancy fees. Thus, the transaction costs for companies accompanying an 
international merger, cooperation agreement or strategy exert a relevant burden on 
companies (overview: ICN 2002). While this may represent a welcome additional 
deterrence of anticompetitive arrangements and conduct, the additional costs from 
multiple procedures also fall on unproblematic and procompetitive cases, thus 
discouraging some beneficial strategies and arrangements (inter alia, Evenett 2002; 
De Loecker et al. 2008). In balance, it seems difficult to argue that there is no harm 
for welfare from additional administrative and transactional costs burdened on 
taxpayers and companies. 
The ICN has been active in developing best practices for many elements of antitrust 
procedures and, through this soft and voluntary process of harmonization, seeks to 
alleviate the burden from multiple procedures. However, since the ICN as a voluntary 
cooperation network of competition authorities does not have executive power to 
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allocate any given case to one single jurisdiction, the results of these efforts are 
limited – but still highly valuable. Obviously, the effects of digitization further 
increase the burden from multiple procedures because of the increase in 
international and intercontinental business activities. In the absence of more far-
reaching cooperation towards an international competition policy regime (Fox 2000; 
Cabral 2003, 2005, 2017; First 2003; Budzinski 2008a, 2015), the ICN way becomes 
even more valuable and necessary because of the increase in multiple procedure 
cases. However, as I argue in section 5, the process of digitization is also likely to 
increase the diversity of competition policies. Since especially the dealing with data-
based business models and strategies (Budzinski & Kuchinke 2020) also requires new 
procedures, the soft harmonization process will likely be challenged here. It may be 
considered, though, that in the absence of powerful agencies vis-à-vis the global 
digital giants, multiple costs of national procedures may recapture some of the 
deterrence effect lost by the asymmetry of power. 
Notwithstanding, altogether the problem of the costs for companies and taxpayers 
from multiple procedures can be expected to aggravate with the ongoing digitization 
of the economy. 
4  Loopholes in the Protection of Competition 
Protecting competition requires an effective competition policy regime. While – also 
thanks to the activities of the ICN – more and more countries (but not all) possess 
competition laws and enforcement agencies nowadays, not all of these regimes are 
effective and sufficiently powerful. In theory, the inbound-focused effects doctrine 
allows every country to protect competition in its domestic markets as well as within 
its part of international markets. However, whether a national competition authority 
is also able to effectively enforce its competition law against global player companies 
from abroad, depends on several factors: (i) a national competition policy regime 
must exist, (ii) the national competition authorities must be workable (and not just 
paper tigers), and (iii) the relevance of the domestic markets must be high enough 
to make international companies comply with rulings of the national competition 
authorities. Ultimately, domestic enforcement power against antitrust violations 
from abroad relies on the power to restrain access to domestic markets, be it by 
monetary sanctions on domestic turnovers or be it by prohibiting domestic sales. 
Thus, when facing rulings or sanctions by a national competition authority, any 
international company must weigh the importance of that national market for its 
business with the costs of complying with the national (antitrust) laws. In tendency, 
comparatively wealthy industrialized countries enjoy a lot of power to enforce their  
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competition laws, whereas comparatively poorer developing countries struggle (Gal 
2009). Consequently, loopholes arise in particular where companies competing on 
international or intercontinental markets restrict competition with negative effects 
only in smaller and poorer countries. Then, the inbound-focused regimes of the more 
powerful countries do not capture the negative effects and the smaller authorities 
are not sufficiently powerful to effectively combat the incoming anticompetitive 
arrangements and conduct. The literature offers an impressive list of examples (Jenny 
2003a, 2003b; Levenstein & Suslow 2004).  
Notwithstanding, umbrella effects limit the scope of the loopholes (albeit not 
eroding them). Smaller competition policy regimes benefit from decisions by larger 
authorities effectively combating an anticompetitive arrangement that would also 
have affected the smaller regimes’ jurisdiction. If European or American antitrust 
authorities, for instance, break up a cartel or prohibit a merger because it adversely 
affected consumers in their domestic markets, this arrangement becomes ineffective 
in most cases also for the smaller competition policy regime’s domestic markets. 
Therefore, competition on their markets is indirectly protected by the actions of the 
bigger regimes and, to some extent, the smaller regimes may hide under the 
umbrella of the big regimes. However, if a certain arrangement or conduct only 
affects markets in smaller competition policy regimes, no umbrella effects are 
available.  
The ICN is contributing to the reduction of such loopholes through its activities to 
empower smaller competition policy regimes and increase their effectiveness. In the 
course of the process of digitization, more powerful (American, Chinese, etc.) 
companies confront smaller regimes and it will be interesting to witness whether 
these – with the help of the ICN – empowered and better eqipped regimes of smaller 
and poorer countries will be able to enforce their antitrust laws against internet 
giants. However, there is reason for skepticism. As far as we can observe by now, the 
digital economy seems to go along with a shift in the type of anticompetitive 
conduct. Digital companies do not seem to engage in cartels as much as traditional 
industries – so far, at least. Mergers are an issue but often it is about so-called killer 
acquisitions of potential future competitors (i.e. taking upcoming mavericks off the 
market) and not so often mega-mergers among equals. The most relevant type of 
antitrust violation relevant for the digital economy, however, appears to be abuse of 
market power. Due to direct and indirect network effects, market power positions 
are more likely to surface in the digital economy and the decrease of the costs of 
geography (i.e. costs of distance) implies that powerful positions are often 
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international in nature.2 Consequently, smaller competition policy regimes will be 
confronted more often with particularly powerful companies (enjoying strong 
market power with an almost global reach). Unfortunately, strategies abusing market 
power represent the area of competition policy, where umbrella effects often do not 
occur because a certain practice (e.g. access or use of personalized data, forced 
bundling and tying, or some types of remedies against an artificial blocking of 
compatibility) may be prohibited in one country but still be executed in another.  
A new type of enforcement problems, generating new loopholes, may be the 
availability and costs of data- and information-technology-related specialists. 
Notoriously, companies are willing and/or able to pay experts at considerably higher 
salaries than competition authorities. Already sophisticated economic expertise 
proves to be (sometimes too) expensive for smaller and developing jurisdictions 
(Budzinski & Beigi 2015) and the market for data specialists is considerably scarcer. 
Therefore, the process of digitization is likely to aggravate already existing expert-
knowledge-financing problems of authorities and due to a lack of availability of top 
specialists, even the ICN procedures may find it difficult to provide help (in terms of 
best practice recommendations). In summary, problems of loopholes for 
internationally powerful companies with respect to smaller and poorer competition 
policy regime are likely to increase through digitization. 
5  Diversity of Societies and Economics 
Real-world competition regimes differ not only with respect to their economy and 
market structures (section 2), their intentions (section 2), their procedures (section 
3), and their power towards multinational companies (section 4). They also (i) pursue 
different goals and standards and (ii) apply different economic theories, concepts 
and methods. Firstly, different countries and societies want their competition policy 
to achieve different goals and measure pro- and anticompetitiveness of 
arrangements and conduct according to different standards. Even though economic 
science points to welfare as the preferable ultimate goal of competition policy and 
is predominantly skeptical about adding other goals, democratic societies entail the 
right to trade some degree of efficiency or (economic-material) welfare against goals 
they view to be more important (like market integration, economic development, 
fairness, high employment, international competitiveness, climate policy, etc.) – at 
                                                 
2 Note that there is no automatism or inevitability for dominant positions to emerge in digital markets. 
Competition among online platforms is possible and desirable and economic research is pointing out 
(and further researching) the conditions for sustainable competition among online services, like for 
instance compatibility and inter-operability, low switching costs, multi-homing, etc. (inter alia, 
Haucap & Heimeshoff 2014; Haucap & Stühmeier 2016; Budzinski & Stöhr 2019a; Budzinski & 
Kuchinke 2020).  
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least if there is transparency about the welfare costs of doing so. And, furthermore, 
even within economics it is not perfectly clear what the ‘right’ welfare standard is: 
consumer welfare vs. total welfare; allocative welfare vs. dynamic welfare, protection 
of the competitive process vs. maximizing efficiency, etc. (inter alia, Farrell & Katz 
2006; Kerber 2009; Vanberg 2011; Werden 2011). 
Secondly, there is no and there cannot be a consensus on a unifying theory of 
competition within economics (Budzinski 2008b). This is particularly true with 
respect to both the evolution of science (theory innovation and development) and 
the dynamics of the phenomenon, market competition, itself: companies innovate 
on pro- as well as on anticompetitive behavior. Therefore, different competition 
policy regimes will legitimately base their theories of competitive harm on diverging 
economic approaches – probably not always but at least in some of the cases. 
Consequently, the dividing line between procompetitive and anticompetitive 
arrangements and conduct will not be exactly the same in each jurisdiction. The same 
is true for investigational and analytical methods, which also change in line with 
scientific evolution and market dynamics.  
Altogether, the diversity of societies and economics justifies some diversity of 
competition policy regimes. There is no one-size-fits-all model for each country and 
jurisdiction and for all times. This limits the scope for reducing the problems 
discussed in section 2 and 3.3 Moreover, it points to a benefit of having some 
diversity, even in terms of welfare. If several competition regimes experiment with 
different theories and methods, then this offers scope for dynamic institutional 
learning. In case of diversity, competition regimes learn from their own successes 
and failures and, additionally, they learn from other regimes’ successes and failures 
– and, therefore, from more cases in any given frame of time. This mutual learning 
speeds up the learning process, offers potential to dynamically improve competition 
policy, and thus increases welfare (Kerber & Budzinski 2003, 2004). This is particularly 
true if there is no ultimate academic consensus and if new ideas, concepts, solutions 
need to be injected into the policy process in the course of time. However, these 
fundamental benefits of a system with decentralized elements do not imply that the 
same case must be exposed to multiple procedures and conflicting decisions. Instead, 
sophisticated lead-jurisdiction models offer scope for combining welfare benefits of 
competition policy coordination with welfare gains from mutual institutional 
learning and diversity (Campbell & Trebilcock 1993, 1997; Trebilcock & Iacobucci 
2004; Budzinski 2008a, 2009, 2018). 
                                                 
3 Notwithstanding, this does not imply that action to reduce these problems is not valuable. There is 
ample scope for reduce the burdens and welfare losses of uncoordinated national competition 
policies. However, in the absence of an uniform worldwide competition policy regimes, these 
problems will never be reduced to zero.  
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Throughout its first two decades, the ICN has employed its best practice approach to 
contribute to less diverging interpretations of goals, concepts and theories among 
competition authorities. This was particularly done by aiming to develop a common 
competition culture among the participating antitrust agencies and by developing 
and suggesting informal standards for the use of economic theories and methods in 
competition policy proceedings. 
Goals, theories and methods of competition policy are particularly affected by the 
process of digitization. With respect to goals, the digital economy leads to a stronger 
amalgamation between consumer welfare pursued by competition policy and 
consumer welfare pursued by consumer protection policy (inter alia, Bhattacharya & 
Buiten 2018; Buiten 2018). The German Facebook case represents a striking example: 
the German competition authority investigated, inter alia, whether a permanent 
violation of data protection and privacy standards (as a part of consumer protection 
policy) can constitute an abuse of market power and, respectively, can be interpreted 
as an indication for existing market power (see on the case Buiten 2019). Similar 
questions on the interface of antitrust policy and consumer protection policy are 
discussed in many countries including the consolidation of agency competencies in 
these two areas. Furthermore, the rise of the digital economy is accompanied by the 
emergence and innovation of new business strategies, next to platform strategies in 
particular data-based strategies like zero-priced service offers financed by revenues 
from sophisticated analyses of the personalized data collected from the service’s 
users and data-based individualized search and recommendation systems. These 
market phenomena require new economic concepts and theories (contemporary 
overview: Budzinski & Kuchinke 2020) and express themselves in innovative pro- and 
anticompetitive arrangements and conduct. Some features of digital markets like the 
paying-with-data character further require new methods for analysis since “classical” 
price- and turnover-based measures may not work adequately anymore. Other issues 
include – but are not limited to – changing consumption behavior (e.g. desire for a 
one-stop shop at one platform for everything accompanying walled garden 
strategies by companies), a new importance of compatibility and inter-operability 
among digital services, or data stocks as entry barriers (including access to data as a 
possible precondition for competition). Obviously, economic theory is developing 
parallel to the new market phenomena and there are considerable dynamics of new 
insights. 
With respect to the diversity issue, the process of digitization entails pros and cons. 
On the pro side, the diversity of competition policy regimes allows for a process of 
experimenting for adequate rules for competition in a digitized world. Different 
concepts and methods can be applied and mutual learning, which is particularly 
fruitful in times of considerable change, can help antitrust authorities to get to grips 
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with the challenges from the digital economy. On the contra side, however, regimes 
are drifting away from each other. While the understanding of competition and the 
borderline between pro- and anticompetitive arrangements and conduct is 
converging regarding traditional industries, it may be diverging with respect to 
digital industries.  
Germany, for instance, is currently discussing a 10th amendment4 of its competition 
law based upon a proposal that includes significant changes in addressing abusive 
behavior. In the digital economy, relative market power vis-á-vis vertically dependent 
companies, a new concept of intermediary power, as well as paramount significance 
for competition across markets shall suffice in the future for abuse control to 
intervene (instead of requiring market dominance in the traditional sense). Moreover, 
the various expert reports from antitrust regimes regarding how to deal with the 
digital economy show considerable differences – in particular regarding the ways to 
combat anticompetitive arrangements and conduct within the digital economy 
(Barreto et al. 2019; Haucap et al. 2019; Kerber 2019; Schallbruch et al. 2019; 
Steenbergen et al. 2019). Shall killer acquisitions of small maverick start-ups without 
considerable turnover by internet giants be prohibited? Do transaction-value-based 
thresholds capture these mergers? How to include concepts of economic 
dependence into competition law, based on what theories and by using which 
methods (Bougette et al. 2019)? These and many other relevant questions will be 
answered by different competition policy regimes in different ways. And before the 
process of mutual learning from parallel experimentation has not taken place, it will 
be difficult to derive best practices. Theoretical and empirical economics provide 
some guidance but due to the significant underlying dynamics (both of market 
behavior and of economic insights), the scientific learning process is not concluded 
yet as well. And, of course, this development entails a feedback loop to the issues 
discussed in section 2: the increasing divergence of approaches is likely to create 
more incompatible decisions and more jurisdictional conflicts. 
6  The Role of the ICN in Its Third Decade 
Altogether, the process of digitization entails a number of challenges for 
international competition policy. First, the digitization of markets and goods 
increases the number of cross-border, interjurisdictional cases regarding cartels, 
mergers and acquisitions, as well as anticompetitive market behavior. Second, digital 
platforms and data-based business models increase the probability of dominant 
companies on intercontinental scales as well as problems of economic dependency 
                                                 
4 See Budzinski and Stöhr (2019a) on how already the recent 9th amendment represents a departure 
from the common competition policy framework in the EU. 
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on few global player companies. Third, the economics of digital platforms and data-
based competition strategies partly differ from traditional standard economics and 
are still being developed in the academic world. Consequently, the previous 
convergence of competition policy practices across jurisdictions tends to shift 
towards a process of divergence with respect of how to deal with innovative pro- 
and anticompetitive conduct in the digital world. Altogether, digitization challenges 
international competition policy by an increase of externalities and jurisdictional 
conflicts, increasing costs from multiple procedures, more loopholes, and generally 
diverging regimes. In particular, if these developments are accompanied by a revival 
of strategic competition policies, the current “system” of national competition policy 
regimes dealing with international and intercontinental business behavior may face 
tough times. On the other hand, only a decentralized system of competition policies 
offers the necessary openness and flexibility to deal with the underlying dynamics of 
the markets themselves as well as of the academic knowledge about the digital 
economy.  
Thus, the process of digitization is already challenging and will further challenge the 
role of the ICN in its third decade. Its fundamental approach to identify best practices 
and create a soft harmonization process by peer pressure towards adapting the 
published (and consensually agreed upon) best practices rests on experience with the 
targeted industries and the surfacing pro- and anticompetitive strategies and 
arrangements. However, the novel character of business models and strategies – pro- 
and anticompetitive ones – in the digital economy implies that best practices are not 
yet found. As a consequence, the ICN needs to move forward from focusing on 
comparing existent policies towards developing and pondering new solutions. And 
it is already starting to embrace such approaches on its way into its third decade. It 
will be interesting to see how the ICN will be able to withstand the uprising of 
uncooperative and strategic policy approaches that quickly may include strategic 
competition policies. 
Still, while the ICN approach is definitely superior to an uncoordinated approach, 
scientific insight from economics favor an enhanced integration of competition 
policy regimes vis-á-vis the increasing international and intercontinental character of 
competition. Concepts for reducing the (welfare) costs of multiple and conflicting 
proceedings and decisions as well as for closing loopholes without jeopardizing a 
beneficial diversity and openness have been proposed (Trebilcock & Iacobucci 2004; 
Budzinski 2008a, 2009, 2018). However, it remains unclear whether a window of 
opportunity to move towards such scenarios will emerge during the ICN’s third 
decade and whether the ICN, in such a case, can play the role of a facilitator towards 
more enhanced and more binding forms of cooperation. 
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